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Abstract:
The genocide of the Ottoman Armenians is not in doubt. But historiciz-
ing these events within the context of diverse and segmented Armenian 
responses to the 1914-1918 war has proved more problematic, not least 
as acknowledging any element of separatist or even insurrectionary in-
tentions might appear to give retrospective legitimacy to the claims that 
the Ittihadust regime was acting against a genuine security threat. In 
considering the origins, scope and outcome of the Ottoman-Armenian 
collision by comparative reference to a synchronous British-Irish dynam-
ic this essay seeks to more than simply illustrate how peoples across the 
globe were thrown through the maelstrom of war into unlikely, includ-
ing sometimes murderous contact with one another. More importantly, 
its purpose is to probe how for all the singularity of the Medz Yeghern, 
the Armenian fate might be understood within a broader landscape of 
emergent European secessionist nationalism and imperial response both 
during and in the aftermath of the Great War.
Keywords: Armenian Genocide, Dashnaksutiun (Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation), Easter Rising, Irish Republican Brotherhood, World War I
1. Introduction
Are two momentous events on the same day, in succeeding years, tak-
ing place at opposite ends of the European continent, a sufficient basis for 
1 This essay is an elaboration of a talk given to the Trinity College, Dublin Historical 
Society on 28 March 2017. I am grateful for the opportunity which their invitation afforded.
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historical linkage? In Armenian collective memory, Red Sunday, 24 April 
1915, has come to be nationally marked and commemorated as the begin-
ning of the Ittihadist-initiated and organised genocide of Ottoman Arme-
nians – the Medz Yeghern though in fact what happened that day was the 
mass round up and deportation of up to 270 leading lights in the Armenian 
cultural and political community in Constantinople to two holding centres 
in Ankara (Kévorkian 2011, 251-254). It was later, when the mass deporta-
tions from eastern Anatolia got under way that the majority of this Constan-
tinople elite were murdered. However, an exact year later, on Easter Monday, 
24 April 1916, over 1800 miles to the west, in Dublin, the then provincial 
capital of British Ireland, the republican green, white and orange tricolour 
was unfurled over the city’s General Post Office. This marked the opening 
of the Irish Easter Rising against London rule. Preemptive round-ups of po-
tential lead protagonists as urgently advised by the viceroy went unrealised 
(Townshend 2015, 149-151). Even so within less than a week the Rising was 
expunged in a furious hail of British artillery shells and heavy machine gun 
fire. Total defeat notwithstanding, 24 April is a date of veneration in the Irish 
republican calendar and a subject for national commemoration one hundred 
years on from the Rising.
How can two such unrelated events, the serendipity of their dates not-
withstanding, have any causative connection or consequence except as dispa-
rate outcomes of the larger catastrophe of the Great War? True, like something 
out of Tolstoy’s verdict on history by way of the Napoleonic wars as a great 
mass of people locked into movement “from west to east and from east to 
west”, Irishmen unwittingly found themselves party to the events of Red Sun-
day (Sanborn 2005, 290). The Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter 
Ittihad) round ups in Constantinople were precipitated by the imminence of 
the Anglo-French landings on the beaches of Gallipoli, some 150 miles away, 
in which, on the following day, Irish fusiliers of the 29th division, alongside 
ANZAC and other imperial troops fought and died. Much larger number 
of Irishmen in British uniform would suffer a similar fate a few months lat-
er, in August 1915, as the British attempted to break the Gallipoli deadlock 
with further disastrous landings at Suvla Bay, yet also at the very height of 
the first wave of Armenian deportations and killings (Jeffrey 2000, 37-78).
That as many as 4000 Irishmen died in the eight month Gallipoli cam-
paign perhaps offers some tenuous point of connect between Irishmen and Ar-
menians in the Great War. Small nations, like the Serbs and Belgians too, or if 
one prefers “little allies”, these peoples were seemingly on the same side as parti-
sans in the Entente struggle pitting initially Britain, France and Russia against 
the German-led Central Powers, the Ottoman empire, by late 1914, included.
Except that is not our story. Or at least can only be a problematic part 
of it given that it misses a whole other part, the exclusion of which could be 
read as either historical myopia, or a conscious sleight of hand. The picture of 
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loyal Irishmen fighting for and with the British empire to defeat the Turks, is 
indeed totally discombobulated when set against the Easter Rising in which 
other Irishmen consciously committed treasonable acts against the crown, as 
if they were repudiating any affinity between themselves and those serving 
in British uniform, not to say aided and abetted by the enemy, the Germans. 
But then, through the former prism, this would make the insurrectionists a 
trojan horse, seeking to deliver a stab in the back to the Entente war effort. 
By the same token, the Ittihadist regime’s Armenian Red Sunday round-ups 
the previous year were carried out as a preemptive strike against those who 
were assumed to be aiders and abetters to the British landings, as they po-
tentially broke through to Constantinople. In other words, the vanguard of 
an Armenian population, which supposedly was awaiting for the signal for a 
wider insurrection against Ottoman rule. Or put differently again, another 
trojan horse whose aim was to disrupt the internal security of the Porte at 
a moment when it was being mortally threatened by foreign invasion. This 
truth, if it were a truth, would place the cause of Armenian nationalism and 
that of Irish nationalism not on the same side of the wartime, geo-political 
equation but on diametrically opposite sides.
Again, however, our comparison jars, or simply falls apart at this point, 
given that there is little evidence of a general Armenian insurrectionary move-
ment in 1915, any more than a year later there is much evidence of a general 
Irish uprising. Yet on one level this only muddies the water further for it is 
precisely in the respective states’ responses to insurrection, real if partial, in 
the Irish April 24 case, debatable or largely imagined in the Armenian April 
24 case that the outcomes radically diverge. Whether or not the perceived 
Armenian threat had some underlying reality, the regime’s reaction went far 
beyond anything obviously proportionate. Rather, the Ittihad entered into 
a policy of genocide. By contrast, British retaliation in the Irish case though 
severe and brutal, cannot carry the genocidal epithet, at least not at this giv-
en moment in time. Indeed, it is in the overwhelming nature of the Ittihad 
assault on the Armenians and the manner in which it morally has overshad-
owed everything else which has also had one long-term, negative side-effect 
for historians; the blocking out or placing off-limits of any legitimate con-
sideration of radical Armenian insurrectionary politics in the Great War – 
either on its own terms, or by way of comparative analysis. So much so that 
to unequivocally confirm that there was an optimal genocide in which up 
to one million Armenian men, women and children were slaughtered and at 
the same time there were some Armenian advocates or practitioners of what 
Irish historians would refer to as advanced nationalism – thus, thinking and 
acting in ways not unlike, for instance, the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
(IRB) – would seem to represent not just a category error: a confusion of two 
elements but an unconscionable attempt to deflect from where true respon-
sibility for the genocide lies.
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Rather, however, than getting sidetracked by defending the merits of his-
toricization against Holocaust-informed arguments as to the essence of evil, 
my inclination is to take a cue from Jo Laycock’s recent plea for “the possi-
bilities for moving beyond the national narratives which continue to domi-
nate the field, in particular through connecting the case of the Armenian 
Genocide to what has been termed a ‘transnational turn’ in the writing of the 
history of the First World War” (Laycock 2015, 93). This essay thus seeks to 
address the confusion or plain contradiction alluded to above by adopting an 
integrative approach considering different strands of political action, or in-
deed non-action within the Armenian national camp alongside Irish parallels.
To embrace within this discussion in both cases minority elements who 
were prepared to consider and then act out radical, insurrectionary pro-
grammes for national freedom, does not mean that we either have to front 
load these programmes or treat them in adulatory terms. For the personal 
record, I find the romanticised, commemorative martyrology often invested 
in the IRB, Dashnaksutiun, or armed “freedom fighters” anywhere, highly 
suspect. Equally, an implicit hierarchisation of worth founded on valorising 
heroic Armenian fedayi or Gaelic believers in the idea of blood sacrifice for 
the good of the cause at the expense of those who acquiesced, were passive, 
silent, or ran away, may itself radically distort the historical record. Even, es-
pecially, when set against the reality of the Medz Yeghern. Yet by the same 
token, it seems to me important that a contextualised consideration of that 
same genocide incorporates the flesh and blood role of Armenian national 
actors, some of whom were seeking avant la lettre to take advantage of the 
possibilities that the war held out, even before the defensive struggle against 
the Ittihadists became a matter of sheer existentialist necessity. To acknowl-
edge their existence, alongside other like-minded, avant-garde nationalists in 
other theatres of the Great War thus highlights the central problematic for 
Armenians in their ongoing quest for a universal genocide recognition: the 
imperative to make these actors temporarily invisible in order to streamline 
an essentialist narrative in which only victimhood counts.
Fortunately, for fear of the bad smell which this statement might elicit, 
there is an emerging historical tendency which is seeking to ‘think’ Arme-
nian history within a much broader, global landscape, the genocide included 
and in which comparative questions may be legitimately asked. In particular, 
Sebouh Aslanian has recently breathed fresh air upon what he has inferred 
as a stultified, sometimes monolithic, even politically self-serving national 
monument of “bloated historical memory” by challenging – just as a recent 
generation of Jewish historians have done vis-a-vis a more traditional “lach-
rymose” conception of Jewish history – that Armenian history has to be like 
this too, or that the preservation of a people’s identity in the wake of geno-
cide has to eschew a critical approach to their past. Aslanian’s riposte has 
been to demand a less parochial, less insular, and more interactive and con-
FROM ARMENIAN RED SUNDAY TO IRISH EASTER RISING 113 
nected view of Armenian history as a sub-field of world history, even while 
reaffirming the obvious; that the Medz Yeghern was the great, overwhelm-
ing catastrophe of Armenian contemporary existence. This ‘think’ piece fol-
lows a similar path in attempting to ask difficult but necessary questions 
aimed at understanding the trajectory of Armenian national politics within 
the wider urge towards national self-determination as a consequence of the 
1914-1918 trauma. This is not to propose a “teleological and linear unfold-
ing of the nation-form […] towards its natural nirvana of the nation-state” 
(Aslanian 2014, 130-134). It is, however, to pose a key conundrum as to why 
by the end of the war the advanced nationalists almost everywhere on the 
European or near-European stage, the Armenians as much as the Irish, had 
come from the margins to centre political stage.
Yet the paradox particular to the Armenians is that this radical tendency 
while central to a prior and then subsequent staging of national struggle as 
it has informed collective national memory and memorialisation has been 
largely blanked out or obfuscated in relation to the key period leading up to, 
including and immediately after the genocide. This essay does not suggest 
new information on the matter. Instead, by reference to the Irish parallel 
it simply sketches a comparative, exploratory pathway into the fraught and 
contested arena of Great War national politics, the role of Armenian insur-
rectionists included. We pursue this by a three part set of comparisons each 
one signposted by the names of metropolitan and provincial cities within the 
British and Ottoman empires.
2. Constantinople – London
In the spring and early summer of 1914, before war clouds cast their gi-
ant shadow across the continent, the auguries for some sort of resolution of 
Irish and Armenian questions seemed both promising and plausible. State 
authorities at the Porte and Westminster were engaged in protracted negoti-
ations involving leading representative spokesmen from the main Armenian 
and Irish political parties respectively. To be sure, it was foreign powers, not 
Ittihad, who had initiated the latest set of proposals. Even so, and albeit un-
der duress, the Porte’s acceptance of the 1914 Armenian reform plan, as the 
British government’s commitment to the passing an Irish Home Rule Bill, 
represented singular developments which, if they had been carried through 
into practical implementation, might have morally disarmed and very pos-
sibly led to the complete sidelining of the advocates for liberation struggle.
In Ireland the demand for an autonomous and self-governing island of 
Ireland within the framework of an ongoing constitutional though subordi-
nate relationship to London had been the subject of two previous failed late 
19th century efforts. Now constitutional changes denying an historic veto re-
peatedly exercised by the House of Lords, provided the Liberal Asquith gov-
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ernment with a window of opportunity to pass Home Rule into law. It came 
with the clamouring for and full backing of the elected Irish Parliamentary 
party (Dangerfield 1976, 113-117). By a rather different route the Russian-
initiated, Great Power-backed reform plan for the six Armenian vilayets and 
province of Trabzon – again a reworking of an earlier failed effort – paved the 
way for direct European supervision of the region, with particular responsi-
bility for the resolution of Armenian grievances. While not a programme for 
secession, or even Armenian autonomy, with leading political and religious 
figures from the Armenian National Assembly central to the programme’s 
formulation, the reform package even in its diluted region as split into two 
February 1914 version, remained substantially weighted towards Armenian 
interests as against other especially Kurdish and Circassian groups on the 
plateau (Kieser, Polatel, Schmutz 2015, 285-304). With a Norwegian and a 
Dutch inspector readied in Constantinople in the early summer to take up 
their supervisory posts in the vilayets, the Reform Plan took on the force of 
law as did Asquith’s Government of Ireland Act when it received Royal As-
sent on 28 September.
That by this juncture the Great War was already in full catastrophic swing 
in the West and about to be driven down an even more apocalyptic path by 
Ittihad adherence to the German side in the east, is testimony enough to the 
still-born nature of these developments. Home Rule was suspended for the 
duration of the war, the Reform Plan repudiated by the Porte. By the end of 
the war both projects were utterly redundant. Worse, one could persuasively 
argue that they actually accelerated the ensuing road to state-community con-
flict, perhaps further inferring that even in peace time neither project could 
ever have been implemented without recourse to massive violence.
The Russian Reform Plan’s resurrection in 1912 came at a moment when 
Ottomania was reeling from a first set of disasters in the Balkan wars. Having 
lost almost the entirety of its European territory, the so-called Mandelstam 
scheme seemed to be pointing towards a more deviously Byzantine route by 
which the Porte would be wrested of almost half its remaining Anatolian heart-
land too. That in itself could be interpreted as a casus belli. The fact, however, 
that key figures in the Ottoman Armenian establishment had been party to 
the project, over the heads of their erstwhile and in some cases ongoing Ittihad 
interlocutors, not to say in foreign embassies in the very heart of Constantino-
ple, could equally be viewed as hostile even treasonable acts (Kévorkian 2011, 
153-165). Meanwhile the whiff of cordite was in some ways even more palpa-
ble in a London moving from a drawing board Home Rule to practical imple-
mentation. Opposition from Ulster Protestants – the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF) – intent on sabotaging the plan by way of the illegal gun-running into 
northern Ireland ports of almost 25,000 modern German rifles and ordnance 
to match, in April 1914, was met by the self-formation of an Irish Volunteer 
force in the overwhelmingly Catholic south intent on its decisive implementa-
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tion (Dangerfield 1976, 110-115). London was thus faced in the summer of 1914 
with a situation in Ireland in some ways more akin to eastern Anatolia than 
a Western democracy ruled by law, with sectarian para-military forces facing 
each other off, dark talk of (and provisional state planning for) the partition of 
Ireland, and the prospect of a real, no holds-barred civil war.
However, before one dismisses out of hand the likelihood of either re-
formist programme ever being peacefully realised, a word in their defence. 
In the metropolitan world before August 1914, national grievances within 
imperial states were still sometimes perceived as resolvable (one thinks par-
ticularly of Austria-Hungary) without a maximalist recourse to complete 
and irrevocable national separation. The very idea of a devolved Ireland but 
still within some wider British framework thus speaks not just to realities of 
power but to ideas of rapprochement and accommodation as most clearly ex-
pressed by John Redmond, the head of the Irish party. This tendency reach-
ing back into the 19th century was pursued in spite of and perhaps because 
of the depth of Catholic Irish resentment against historic subjugation to and 
continuing rule by the English through ‘the viceroy’ in Dublin Castle and 
in economic practice, through a landowning Protestant Ascendancy. Over 
and beyond the political struggle, not to say a cultural one in which Catho-
lic Irish were repeatedly held in a contempt bordering on overt racism, the 
issue of land rights, and loss, further embedded in bitter memory through a 
perceived absentee landlord class’s unpitying response to their peasants’ mass 
starvation, death or flight abroad in the Great Famine of the 1840s, high-
lighted the necessity for a political process which would effectively return 
Irish land to an Irish people2.
It is perhaps significant that land rights, or more precisely the lack of 
them for an Armenian peasantry reeling from decades of lawless, violent en-
croachment from Kurdish tribal overlords and muhajir settlers were also at 
the core of Ottoman Armenian efforts to come to an accommodation with 
the post-1908 incumbents at the Porte and on the basis of the ongoing in-
tegrity of the empire. The notion is not outlandish. A pluralist Ottoman 
equality of peoples overriding a historic hierarchisation based on Muslims 
over millet dated back to the mid-19th century Tanzimat period of constitu-
tional reform3. Then repudiated by the sultan Abdul Hamid II, Ittihad and 
Dashnaksutiun were closely aligned in their conspiratorial anti-Hamidian 
programmes and strategies for a change of regime and return to the consti-
tution. Once ostensibly achieved in the 1908 Young Turk revolution, elected 
Dashnak deputies, as other leading Armenian politicians, shared a common 
milieu with Ittihad in the subsequently re-inaugurated parliament in Con-
2 See Foster 1988, Chapters 8, 14, 16, 17, for critical overview.
3 See Hanioğlu 2008, for Tanzimat overview.
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stantinople, identified in key respects with the latter’s progressive, modernis-
ing goals, and often joined them in electoral lists and platforms. They mixed 
socially too just as Irish Party MPs did in London, especially with radical 
Liberals and Labourites. When the Young Turk movement was in danger 
in April 1909 from more reactionary forces, Ittihadists including latter-day 
gènocidaires, Talaat and Dr Nazim, took refuge in the homes of high-ranking 
Armenian political friends (Kévorkian 2011, 43-74).
To be sure these close relationships were put under acute strain as the re-
gime faltered in the face of anti-Armenian massacres which swept from Adana 
across Cilicia in the wake of the counter-revolutionary moment. Subsequent re-
criminations, charges and counter-charges of bad faith or worse, equally soured 
the joint commission which the two parties set up a few months later to report 
on social problems on the plateau and to consider a land reform programme 
aimed to address entrenched feudalism on the one hand, and the range of ar-
bitrary – and hence extralegal – exactions of peasants, Armenian and non-Ar-
menian, on the other. It was Ittihadist dilatoriness or unwillingness to carry 
through in any meaningful manner on this programme which the Dashnaks 
held as grounds for the formal termination of the alliance in August 1912 as 
undoubtedly it also acted as a goad to the initiation of pourparlers with the 
Great Power embassies (Kaligian 2009, 53-59; Kévorkian 2011, 131-135). Still, 
this was not the end of Dashnak efforts to work with the regime. Nor were 
the Ittihad themselves yet so publicly ill-disposed to their erstwhile Armenian 
comrades to ignore the fact that in the essentially triangular ethnic struggle 
on the plateau, Armenians were the obvious counterweight to the Kurds and 
arguably the more reliable and loyal allies. Indeed, when in spring 1914 Kurd-
ish tribes in the Bitlis region rose with rather overt Russian backing in armed 
revolt, Dashnak cadres were authorised to arm themselves against Kurdish at-
tack and even on occasion to support regular Ottoman troops against the in-
surgency (Kaligian 2009, 184).
Even as war loomed, there were no clear signs that Armenian-Turkish, 
and more specifically Ittihad-Dashnak relations were in complete meltdown. 
News that the other main Armenian revolutionary party, the Hnchaks, in 
their September 1913 congress held in Romania had resolved to take up 
again “violent revolutionary tactics” to defeat Ittihad’s “criminal plans” were 
in turn greeted with alarm by many former party stalwarts within the em-
pire who had been increasingly moving towards an entirely more moderate 
reformist position. Moreover, as mobilisation got under way, leading Arme-
nian religious and political spokesmen affirmed their support for the war ef-
fort and to the integrity of the empire. At the local level, on the plateau, the 
tenor of these statements was corroborated by valis and other local officials 
who reported back to the Porte news of vocal Dashnak support for and as-
sistance in the mobilisation schedule. Union sacrée between Ottoman state 
and peoples thus seemed to be the order of the day just as it was elsewhere 
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among the belligerent powers (Suny 2015, 196-197, and 220-221). If there 
were doubts, not to say restiveness among the wider Armenian population 
at the new, post-revolution innovation whereby non-Muslims were liable for 
military service alongside Muslim able-bodied menfolk, nevertheless, for the 
most part, there was a resigned compliance among an estimated 200,000 Ar-
menian men eligible for induction into the army (Mann 2005, 136).
Irish elite pronouncements of loyalty to empire were altogether more pro-
fuse. Again, in the van was Redmond who in a House of Commons speech 
on 3 August, the day before Britain declared war on Germany, pledged that 
the Irish National Volunteers in the south would join forces with the Prot-
estant ones in the north both to defend the island of Ireland and the British 
empire of which it was part, in its hour of need. Redmond was prepared to 
be more proactive still, issuing a manifesto in the following month in which 
Home Rule was due to pass into law, calling on Irishmen to join the British 
colours “for the defence of the sacred rights and liberties of small nations and 
the respect and enlargement of the great principle of nationality” (Hennes-
sey 1998, 86). Indeed, with that in mind he urged the British government 
to create a recognised Irish army. No such specific entity was authorised by 
Westminster but there was an early surge of Irish nationalists responding 
to Redmond’s call to arms; a significant proportion of the some 200,000 
Catholic as well as Protestant Irish who served in the British army during 
the Great War. Among them would be members of the 16th Irish Division 
slaughtered in the months after the Dublin Uprising on the Somme, as also 
those in the 10th Irish Division caught up in the carnage the previous year at 
Gallipoli4. By then, however, the war had so unravelled the tenuous sinews 
of rapprochement as to leave the political field seemingly open for decisive 
if albeit differently traumatic Irish and Armenian uncouplings from impe-
rial subservience.
3. Van – Dublin
An early indication of things to come in Ireland manifested itself at the 
very outset of the war when the original founders of the Irish Volunteers led 
by Eoin MacNeill repudiated Redmond’s co-option of the movement and 
organisationally broke away to re-found it effectively as the potentially insur-
rectionary arm of the IRB. Initially, the split still favoured the Redmondites 
whose newly named National Volunteers were estimated to number all but 
11,000 of the 180,000 strong force prior to August 1914 (Hennessey 1998, 
91). Yet thereafter the seepage from the moderates to the radicals was marked 
before it ultimately turned into a post-Easter Rising flood. It was not just 
4 Jeffrey 2000, 5-7, for evaluation of the number of Irishmen who served.
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that Redmond’s declaration of a “war for high ideals” (86) sounded increas-
ingly hollow not least when Asquith almost simultaneously reneged on the 
promise of an all Ireland Home Rule by pronouncing that there could be no 
British action to coerce Ulster to the fact. A year later, the breach widened 
with the apparent snub by the War Office, not least to Redmond himself, 
when there was no official mention of the role of Irish regiments in the Gal-
lipoli campaign when other British units were cited in dispatches and suit-
ably lionised (109).
The Irish were as used to being historically treated by the British, in mili-
tary affairs as everything else, as a lesser form of pond life, or just simply invis-
ible, just as Armenians were used to the pejorative connotations of Ottoman 
dhimmi status. Irish sensitivity to the shackles of British contempt was un-
doubtedly a factor in the founding of Sinn Fein, “We ourselves” in 1905. Its 
founder, Arthur Griffith, forcefully articulated the case for a free, sovereign and 
independent Ireland. It was argued Griffith, the only framework in which the 
Irish could participate on Britain’s side in the war. As it was, Sinn Fein pro-
vided the key nexus for opposition to Irish recruitment. Its politics including 
its contesting of Irish seats against the Irish party, did not however translate 
into overt support for the insurrectionary strategy of the IRB, not least as Grif-
fith’s focus was on constructive non-compliance to British rule (including not 
taking up won seats in Westminster), not on fighting against impossible odds. 
It may have been in part Westminster animus against Sinn Fein’s obstructive 
tactics which led them to misread the Easter rising as Sinn Fein-directed and 
organised (Kee 2000, 438-460).
Where Sinn Fein, the IRB and other advanced nationalist groupings 
held common ground was in their fervent adherence to the Irish cultural 
and more specifically language revival particularly fostered from the late 19th 
century by the Gaelic League. Explicit in this movement was an opposition 
to the Anglicisation of Ireland which in turn intensified the search for the 
folkloric, literary, and historic roots of an ‘authentic’ Ireland before or beyond 
Anglo-Scottish domination. If the recovery of an almost defunct peasant ver-
nacular was the seedbed of a modern Irish national identity formation‒ as 
essentially nurtured by an urban, educated, middle class ‒ its political coun-
terpart was the valorisation of those who in more recent times had sought to 
ferment anti-British insurrection. The IRB of the Easter Rising thus specifi-
cally saw themselves in a long-line of “Fenian” warriors going backthrough 
the failed IRB uprisings in Ireland and Canada of 1867, to the United Irish-
men rebellion of 1798, and its key sequel, the Robert Emmett-led attempt 
to seize Dublin castle and other key strategic locations in the city, in 1803 
(Foster 1988, 431-460). With the exception of 1798, none of these uprisings 
had come remotely close to their goal but then for Padraic Pearse, one of the 
leaders of and recognised voice of the 1916 rising what mattered was not that 
they had militarily succeeded but through their sense of mission, blood sac-
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rifice and martyrdom to the cause had shown the way to how Ireland could 
yet be redeemed “from acquiescence to the Union” (Townshend 2015, 99).
Such arguments might underscore how the shapers of 1916 ‒ with their 
almost mystical sense of nation on the one hand, acute anxieties about how 
that ideal was in danger of being subverted by a febrile self-governing rela-
tionship within Britain on the other ‒ were in key respects a minority ten-
dency remote from the daily life of the majority of ordinary Irishmen. That 
said there was a point of confluence. It was over the matter of conscription. 
For all Redmond’s declarations in support of the war effort, and their heeding 
by many Home Rule nationalists, there were droves of others in grass-roots 
rural Ireland who saw conscription over the horizon and the suppression or 
the radical nationalist press, plus the deportation of agitators who spoke out 
against it under the wartime Defence of the Realm Act, as proof of its im-
minence. By the autumn of 1915 the supposed threat was producing a veri-
table stampede of young men to North America. But already a year earlier, 
in September 1914, elements of the Irish Volunteers, IRB, along with the 
trade unionist leader, James Connolly, had taken their cue from a planned 
Dublin recruiting rally in which Asquith and Redmond were due to speak to 
carry out a coup d’ état. With only eighty armed men responding to the call, 
the would-be insurrection was called off. But then there was no conscription 
in Ireland (Hennessey 1998, 125). Nor before 1916 was there a descent into 
violent internal conflict. Paradoxically, the promise of Home Rule plus the 
allegiance of the Sir Edward Carson-led UVF to Britain put paid ‒ albeit 
temporarily ‒ to that outcome.
The situation was wholly different on the Ottoman eastern Anatolian 
plateau as it merged with the Russian Caucasus. Even before the overt Otto-
man attack on Russian Black sea ports on 29 October, the plateau had been 
in a state of ugly ferment for months. The levels of violence whether perpe-
trated by the army, the so-called Teskilat-i-Mahsusa (Special Organisation) 
local militias, or by ethnic protagonists as they attempted to defend their 
own communal space, were already a portent of the “war of all against all” 
conditions which would be prevalent in the latter years of the war. Having 
put so much purchase on the Reform Plan but alert to the fact that in prac-
tice it was already moribund, Armenian leaders were thus faced with an ex-
quisite dilemma. They could follow the lead from Ittihad, or more precisely, 
its leading light, Dr Sakir, when he and two other Special Organisation em-
issaries pitched up at the end of the Dashnak’s congress in Erzurum in early 
August 1914. In return for helping to foment insurrection on the Russian 
side of the border, Sakir’s Dashnak interlocutors were led to understand that 
the Porte would back an autonomous Armenian state on both sides of the 
border (Kévorkian 2011, 175). Yet that would place the Ottoman Dashnaks 
in direct confrontation with their fellow Armenians who were Russian sub-
jects, the eastern wing of the Dashnak party included. Alternatively, the Ot-
MARK LEVENE120 
toman Armenians could succumb to the blandishments from the other side, 
the Russians, or that matter, the French, or the British. Signals by way of 
Count Vorotsov-Dashkov, Russia’s viceroy in the region, included one from 
the tsar towards the end of 1914 informing the Armenians of their “brilliant 
future” (Salahi Sonyel 2000, 82). The Russians, however, were prepared to 
go further, actively encouraging by way of the Dashnak-dominated Arme-
nian National Bureau in Tiflis that Armenians on the Ottoman side of the 
border join with fellow Russian Armenian druzhiny – volunteers –in taking 
up arms against the Porte (Bloxham 2005, 73; Reynolds 2011, 117).
These sorts of bribes were hardly unique to the Armenian situation. 
The Russians made them equally at the time to Ottoman Nestorians and 
Kurds, as much later in 1916, Sir Mark Sykes in London toyed with another 
British-led, anti-Ottoman “small would-be nations” combination this time 
made up of Arabs, Jewish Zionists and Armenians. In fact, as the war deep-
ened as did the Great Power military stalemate, the notion of attempting to 
entice troubled or troublesome ethnies on the enemy side to one’s own inter-
est became, for Central Powers as for the Allies, almost par for the course. 
The Ottomans were equally participants in this dangerous game of ethnic 
mobilisation, Muslim groups such as the Adzhars on the Russian Caucasus 
side of the border, one potential focus; while encouraged by the Germans, 
the Sheikh-ul-Islam’s declaration of jihad was designed to foment rebellion 
especially in British India and Egypt (Levene 2017, 30, 34).
For groups like the Armenians, or for that the matter the Irish, the key 
issue ‒ that is, for any element within the group both with national aspirations 
and at the same time ready to entertain a relationship with the ‘enemy’‒ was 
the quid pro quo, the return, in other words, on their high risk investment 
in the undertaking. The prospect of aligning oneself to the enemy’s chances 
of victory might seem to present opportunities for national fulfilment which 
otherwise might have appeared remote if not delusional. Yet the price of par-
ticipation contained a nasty sting on two counts. Firstly, there was the blood 
price, literally, how many men could you offer as cannon fodder. And it is sig-
nificant that numbers were often quite fantastically plucked out of the air by 
both patrons, or supplicants, often as equal indication of their desperation. At 
the time of the February 1915 planning for the so-called Alexandretta feint, 
for instance, in which the British were considering a diversionary landing 
in Cilicia in support of their main Dardanelles objective, an irregular aux-
iliary force of 15,000 Armenian Zeitunlis was conjured up seemingly out of 
nowhere. This figure however would be trumped by French confabulations 
that 100,000 Greek insurgents would rise in support of an Entente landing 
in Asia Minor while British military intelligence in Cairo a little later got 
into their heads the same or more Arabs in Ottoman uniform turning their 
guns on their Turkish officers in an even more fanciful flight of wish-fulfil-
ment (Bloxham 1991, 176-178). But there again, just before the Easter Ris-
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ing, Count Plunkett, the father of one its key protagonists, delivered a letter 
to the Pope claiming that the Irish Catholic nation had an “effective force of 
80,000 trained men” ready for action (Townshend 2015, 123).
Which brings us to the second sting. However much numbers of sup-
posed insurgents, Irish, Armenian, Czech, Polish, Ukrainian, Arab ‒ were 
inflated or not, however much indeed any of these forces really counted for 
something, or not ‒ they fed into a climate of paranoia, suspicion, hysteria 
and spy mania which gripped all the main belligerents almost from the war’s 
outset. The paranoia centred precisely on those ethnies who were considered 
most suspect if not downright traitorous to the state’s war effort. Thus, if it 
were perceived as true that any such ethnic group was organising disruption 
and sabotage in the rear of the actual fronts, by attempting to cut commu-
nication and supply lines, for instance, perhaps as a prelude either to a more 
widespread people war, or, then again, in support of foreign enemy invasion, 
then the state in turn might claim its worst fears had been realised. The ar-
gument had an inbuilt circularity, not least as all the belligerents were try-
ing to foment exactly such uprisings among their enemies ‘subject’ peoples. 
That said, the very charge of insurgency was bound to expose any so accused 
community to the state’s special and extraordinary security measures, retri-
bution, or worse.
So, how much evidence is there to suggest there was an insurrectionist 
agenda within the Armenian camp? Some of the reportage is unclear or con-
tradictory. We know that there were intense discussions at the summer 1914 
Dashnak Erzurum congress on what the party ought to do. In the wake of 
the arrests just weeks earlier of most of the Hnchak leadership in Constan-
tinople on charges of anti-state conspiracy and with it the effective destruc-
tion of that party organisation, it is surprising that, equally sensing danger to 
themselves, the Dashnaks maintained a clear official line of support for the 
Porte. That said, there were dissenters who broke away to throw in their lot 
with the Russian Armenian druzhiny. One notable example was Hovhannes 
Kachaznuni, who tasked by the congress with making contact with the west-
ern bureau to request they desisted from their volunteer programme, on arrival 
in the Caucasus joined the druzhiny himself (Suny 2015, 221)5. Another was 
the almost legendary revolutionary, Armen Garo. Already in the Caucasus 
was the equally legendary Andranik who had only recently arrived from the 
Bulgarian front opposing the Ottomans in the Balkan wars, where he had 
led a several hundred strong Armenian volunteer battalion. This role he now 
resumed under the aegis of the Russian Caucasus army. Andranik in par-
ticular represented a strand in Armenian advanced nationalism founded on 
the idea of liberation through armed action and in which he had been a par-
5 Sonyel 2000, 83-85, for contrasting interpretations.
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ticipant since the 1880s, not least as a fedayi in the second Sasun uprising in 
1904 and before that the fabled 1901 battle of the Holy Apostles Monastery6. 
His revolutionary career as that of Armen Garo thus offered a connecting 
thread back into a recent history of defiant resistance to Hamidian or Kurd-
ish depredations, including the earlier Sasun uprising of 1894, and the 1862 
Zeitun rebellion, in each case against seemingly impossible odds. But it also 
provided more than simply an emotional lifeline, given the anti-Armenian 
atrocities which preceded and followed but an ‘awakened’ latter-day confir-
mation especially among an increasingly literate and European-orientated 
Armenian middle class that warrior heroes and martyrdom were embedded 
in two millennia of national narrative.
In the precise context of conflict on the plateau and in the Caucasus in 
1914 and early 1915 it also meant that the druzhiny had veteran violence spe-
cialists at their helm who made the IRB likes of Pearse or Joseph Plunkett 
look like innocents abroad. In the early months of a shifting and very porous 
front, the evidence suggests a merciless warfare in which local Christian and 
Muslim communities who were unable to flee paid the price in untold atroci-
ties. In short, the druzhiny, where they could, gave as good as they got. The 
actual numbers who were Ottoman renegades is sketchy, a recent compro-
mise estimate is of between five and eight thousand, a mere fraction of those 
conscripted into the Ottoman army (Mann 2005, 136). Yet their presence 
in the Russian battle line-up, especially at the first major Ottoman military 
disaster in the Caucasus, at the battle of Sarakamish in early 1915, was mag-
nified in elite Ottoman military and Ittihad political circles into proof of a 
more general Armenian perfidy.
In fact the Caucasus was not only the arena in which some Armenians 
were willing to make common cause with the Entente. Nor were they only 
revolutionary Dashnaks or Hnchaks. We have already intimated that early 
planning for the Dardanelles campaign involved the notion of an Allied land-
ing on the Cilician coast. Privy to these developments was Boghos Nubar, 
who had previously been the Armenian diplomatic interlocutor in negotia-
tions for the Armenian reform plan. Appointed by the Catholicos as head of 
the Armenian National Delegation (AND), in practice representing a much 
more elite and socially conservative tendency than the Dashnaks, Boghos 
Nubar nevertheless from November 1914 established contact with Gener-
al Maxwell, head of the British military command in Egypt with a view to 
creating volunteer units there not unlike those under Vorontsov-Dashkov. 
The latter indeed was in turn privy to the Boghos Nubar proposal that a 
Zeitunli-led uprising in Cilicia would help open up a British bridgehead at 
Alexandretta providing for an eventual link-up with the Russians and their 
6 Chalabian 1988, for a suitably hagiographic account.
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Armenian partisans on the plateau. A further Armenian contribution to the 
project would be provided by several thousand diaspora volunteers most spe-
cifically provided by the Armenian National Defence Committee of Amer-
ica, who had also approached the British through the latter’s Boston consul 
(Bloxham 2005, 80-82; McMeekin 2015, 241-243).
There is a shocking irony in the fact that the British shelved plans for the 
Alexandretta feint in spring 1915, given that retrospective assessments suggest 
this was the most “exquisitely vulnerable point in the Ottoman empire’s wall 
of natural defences” (Anderson 2013, 96). A single warship, HMS Doris, had 
in fact penetrated Alexandretta’s meagre sea defences and made an unopposed 
landing there in December 1915. A successful bridgehead from here might 
conceivably have cut the Ottoman empire into two entirely transforming the 
Entente’s chances of bringing about its rapid defeat. With the Ottomans in 
retreat from Cilicia and the plateau, and what Sean McMeekin describes as 
Boghos Nubar’s “kind of liaison Armenian government-in-embryo” (2015, 
173) enabled by way of military materiel and open Entente support, perhaps 
not only might the deportations and hence genocide from eastern Anatolia 
have been forestalled but the way prised open for a more radical, more pro-
Armenian version of the AND’s Reform Plan agenda. Except all this is clearly 
counter-factual. Though Boghos Nubar would attempt to resurrect the Cili-
cia scheme to the British in July having upped the ante to 25,000 Armenian 
co-combatants while also this time making clear the humanitarian urgency 
of the matter, as far as the British were concerned, bogged down as they were 
in their self-inflicted Gallipoli quagmire, the project was dead in the water 
(McMeekin 2015, 173).
Even so, the AND scenario did contain aspects grounded in reality, 
though with unanticipated but catastrophic consequences. Though Boghos 
Nubar’s figures were clearly exaggerated, anti-conscription feelings did en-
gender a localised resistance among some young Armenian Zeitunlis which 
appears to have been an indicator of wider Armenian disaffection as well as 
desertion, both in Cilicia and elsewhere. The Zeitun rebellion, for what it’s 
worth, seems to have been more a spontaneous grass-roots affair rather than 
anything politically coordinated, though Boghos Nubar, at the distance of 
Cairo, appears to have been operating on the assumption that a Cilician up-
rising was conceivable, going so far as to inform Maxwell in early Febru-
ary that local Armenians would offer the British “perfect and total support” 
(Arkun 2011, 221-243; McMeekin 2015, 173).
What matters much more about these developments however is their 
timing. In the wake of Sarakamish and with the first Anglo-French naval 
bombardments of the Dardanelles in February, followed up with greater force 
the succeeding month, panic set in the Ottoman capital, plans for the govern-
ment’s evacuation to inland Eskishehir were put in motion and one critical 
observer, the US ambassador to the Porte, Henry Morgenthau, reckoned that 
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the whole Ottoman edifice was “on the brink of dissolution” (Morgenthau 
1918, 158). It was in the context of this potential “strategic meltdown”, pro-
ducing again in McMeekin’s words “a perfect storm of paranoia” that the 
Ittihad ‒ regardless of whether there was an actual, coordinated Armenian 
threat or not ‒ acted as if they were getting their retaliation in first (McMeekin 
2015, 234). Towards the end of February, the Ottoman General Staff sent a 
directive to field commanders removing all Armenian officers and men from 
headquarter staffs and senior positions of command. In quick succession, a 
general order from War Office supremo and regime triumvir, Enver Pasha, 
disarmed all Armenian serving soldiers with their reduction to labour bat-
talions, while co-triumvir and Interior Minister, Talaat Pasha, ordered the 
deportation of Armenians from Dortyol a coastal rail hub close to Alexan-
dretta. Almost simultaneously, the third triumvir and Syrian region supremo, 
Cemal Pasha, extended the initial deportation order to include Armenians 
from across Cilicia, first men, then women and children too, while merci-
lessly hunting down and executing all alleged Armenian rebels in the Zeitun 
region. Open season on the Armenians across the empire had yet to be offi-
cially declared but at least politically speaking that moment came on the eve 
of the Gallipoli landings when Talaat paved the way for the Constantinople 
round-ups with a new directive to the Ottoman High Command ordering 
the elimination of Hnchak, Dashnak and Boghos Nubar organisations on 
grounds of their incipient revolt. Meanwhile, back on the plateau especially 
in and around Van, the vilayet with the most significant and compact Ar-
menian population, or indeed across the border around Urmia, in techni-
cally neutral Persia where Armenians (and Nestorians) had been armed by 
the Russians to parry major Ottoman incursions, no such declaration of It-
tihad intent was required: directly state-orchestrated or promoted violence 
had been rising to a crescendo of mass atrocity for months (Kévorkian 2011, 
227-234; Suny 2015, 234-237, 253-259, 272-275).
From this perspective, the open Dashnak-led rebellion in Van from 
mid-April 1915, and its successful defence until Russian and druzhiny relief 
the following month, should be read neither as the cause of, or justification 
for the Ittihad anti-Armenian agenda as it emerged thereafter but rather as 
the climax to the violent breakdown of Ottoman-Armenian relations on the 
plateau since the onset of the Great War. To be sure, the Dashnaks would 
not have been able to mount such an effective defence against the increas-
ing firepower ‒ including artillery ‒ of Ottoman Third Army units deployed 
against them, without an arsenal of Mauser pistols and Russian weapons 
and ordnance smuggled into the city in preceding months. Nor without the 
organisational and planning skills of a veteran Dashnak fighter, Arum Ma-
nukian (McMeekin 2015, 227-235). In its own terms, the tenacity of the Van 
defence against overwhelming odds is extraordinary and heroic, the imme-
diate consequences of which were, when the Russians broke the siege on 18 
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May, Aram became, albeit at Russian behest, “the first Armenian supreme 
authority in the region in more than half a millennium” (Suny 2015, 260). 
It also meant that when the Russians were forced to evacuate the region two 
months later, at least some of the Vanetsis avoided the wider fate of Armeni-
ans by then being deported or exterminated en masse.
Certainly, by contrast with the Dublin rising, for which most sanguine 
observers would agree “that the insurgents had no intelligible, or militarily 
speaking intelligent, blueprint”, the Van uprising had some positive effect. But 
then such an upbeat comparative analysis instantly falls down for a more fun-
damental reason (Townshend 2015, 111). After Easter 1916, the Irish volunteer 
movement and its yet to be properly mobilised cadres in the Dublin hinterland 
remained still intact as a potential future fighting force. Yet the Armenian dru-
zhiny, dependent as they were on Russian or other Allied whim, had, bar those 
at Van no reserve force from within the plateau or Cilicia to draw on, should 
their leaders ever attempt an offensive posture. And the reason is a further stark 
contrast to the Irish situation. By 1916, the majority of “battle-age” Ottoman 
Armenian men were dead. Conscripted into the wider Ottoman army, but not 
into specific Armenian units where they might have been able to defend them-
selves, when they were reduced to unarmed labour by Enver’s February 1915 
directives they fell into a trap where as soon as their Ottoman commanders 
received further instructions, or choose off their own volition to act, they were 
subject to mass slaughter. We know far too little about the particular circum-
stances of these events7. What we do know is that the Armenian recruits’ dis-
appearance into the void, plus that of most remaining adult males on the cusp 
of the deportations, meant that in gendered terms there was no element in the 
community in the rear of the front to protect the otherwise most vulnerable: 
women, children, sick and the old, who would subsequently be wiped out in 
the genocide (Jones 2000, 201-202).
It raises a more general question as to degree to which any would-be 
ethnic insurgents, Armenian, Irish, or other, included in their politico-mili-
tary calculations the consequences of their actions for the broad community 
for whom they were claiming to act. What guarantees were there that their 
open armed confrontation with the forces of empire would not provoke an 
altogether more vengeful retaliation or retribution? Sir Roger Casement, the 
key patrician exponent of German cooperation in the Hibernian cause, de-
veloping an already embryonic plan for alignment with Berlin as the strong-
est wartime card advancing Irish claims for sovereign independence, insisted 
that should the Germans then renegue, for instance through annexation, it 
would then be overridden through Great Power outrage (Hennessey 1998, 
133). Similarly, Armenian national efforts towards prising open the doors of 
7 See Zürcher 2002, 187-196 and Kévorkian 2011, 240-242, for further assessment.
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autonomy had strongly relied since 1878 on playing the international card. 
But diplomatic overtures where they blurred as they did in the case of Case-
ment and Plunkett, as Boghos Nubar, into strategic plans based on foreign 
invasion protected one’s population not a jot. On the contrary, in rendering 
it captive to the Trojan horse accusation, supposed safety became entirely 
dependent on the unlikely outcome of the invasion’s complete and, above 
all, swift victory.
However, Casement was no more successful vis-à-vis the Germans than 
his Armenian counterpart was vis-à-vis the British in realising a watertight 
commitment to such an agenda, the support of the Fenian, Irish-American 
Clan na Gael notwithstanding, nor his own efforts to create an “Irish bri-
gade” strike-force from Irish POWs in Germany (Kee 2000, 538-547). Hav-
ing failed with the German-backed scheme, Casement opted for the putative 
brigade’s never realised deployment with the Ottoman forces at Suez, a per-
verse oddity of our entwined narrative, underscored by Pearse’s praise for 
wartime Turkish patriotism as like that of the heroic Belgians in defence of 
their soil (Pearse 1924, 216; Townshend 2015, 116-117). Yet at fundament, 
just as with Alexandretta in 1915, so on the projected West Irish beachhead 
in 1916, the absence of an invasion force, barring a scuttled German boat-
load of mostly captured Russian rifles, left the projected Easter rising literally 
high and dry8. Yet arguably its saving grace at least in human terms was that 
with Casement landed separately by submarine but too quickly captured to 
halt the insurrection, MacNeill’s countermanding order sufficient to achieve 
precisely that among most Irish Volunteer units but not those mobilised in 
and around Dublin, the uprising took on the appearance of a very isolated 
affair. Certainly, at odds with many of the Catholic Irishmen who still be-
lieved that wearing the King’s khaki was the surest route to Home Rule and 
at wide variance with much of demotic Dublin who took the opportunity 
of civil breakdown not to support the insurgents but to go on a mass loot-
ing spree, London was well-positioned to demarcate (if hardly exonerate) the 
majority of Irishmen and women from the actions of a few extremists and 
hotheads (O’Brien 1992, 258-273). Too quickly, however, did the Liberal 
Asquith government dispatch to Ireland one General Maxwell – the same 
general who had held off the Ottoman late 1914 attack on Suez – as mili-
tary governor. Armed with the authority to rule under martial law and in-
tent on doling out exemplary justice to all rebels, London’s intervention to 
forestall death sentences on ninety of some 3,400 arrestees came too late to 
halt the execution of fifteen insurgent ringleaders including Pearse, Plunkett 
and Connolly (Townshend 2015, 269-299). Thereafter, London tried to rein 
8 See "Aud 1916-Cork Shipwrecks", <https//www.corkshipwrecks.net/1916aud.html> 
(05/2018) for details.
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in the forces of retribution, there were no mass reprisals; at least not in 1916 
British-controlled Ireland. Yet the brutality of the British military in put-
ting down the uprising, and above all the creation of martyrs, was treated by 
large swathes of Irishmen formerly ambivalent or even hostile to the insur-
rectionary tendency as an assault on the entirety of the Irish national cause.
4. Salonika – Belfast
Clearly, that still leaves one huge gulf between the scope and scale of 
British violence against the Catholic Irish, even as it accelerated towards 
Anglo-Irish war, and the Ittihad genocide against the Armenians. Even so, 
there is one further, if briefly stated, perspective to consider before drawing 
conclusions. In our first section, we emphasised the possibilities of accom-
modation in either case between state and community, obviating or diluting 
the urge to violent collision. Yet we have failed so far to fully identify and 
thus centre-stage the hard-line, indeed die-hard forces of “statist” resistance 
to any such arrangement. And here, despite the obvious difference in terms 
of outcome there are parallels. These might be summed up in the word “un-
ion”; in the notion of a marriage between imperialism and a strongly sectar-
ian or identity-based nationalism; and in one other significant geographical 
“over the water” aspect: namely disaffected communities within provinces at 
one slight remove from the imperial heartland who saw themselves as hav-
ing most culturally, cognitively, socially and economically to lose from any 
state-led political unravelling.
In the British framework it was in the areas of dense, historic, Protestant 
Anglo-Scottish settlement and supersession of the Catholic Irish, in Ulster, as 
centred on what by 1914, was the highly integrated and industrial port-city 
of Belfast, that opposition to Home Rule took on its most hard, unforgiving 
edge. If the Redmondites staked everything on support for the war in order 
to achieve their political freedom, Ulster Unionists under the leadership of 
Anglo-Irish patrician, Carson and Belfast magnet, James Craig, offered their 
support as a matter (to them) of sheer existential survival. Ulstermen conse-
quently paid what their leaders would repeatedly iterate as the huge “sacrifi-
cial” price for their commitment to the Union in the battles on the Somme: 
their seminal 1916 event (Loughlin 2002, 136-145). 
Yet, paradoxically, in the founding of the UVF four years earlier, they 
had already offered a version of the Union which was prepared to defy Lon-
don in any attempted imposition of Home Rule, if necessary by armed con-
frontation with it. That said, the very threat had the potential to undermine 
the sinews of British liberal democracy, not least when in March 1914 as As-
quith sought to carry through the policy, the majority of the army headquar-
ters staff in Ireland, overwhelmingly of Ascendancy background, resigned in 
protest (Dangerfield 1976, 82-87).
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Yet what is most intriguing about the so-called Curragh mutiny in terms 
of this discussion is its 1908 Ottoman resonances. Middle-ranking officers in 
the Third Army stationed in the great port-city and emerging industrial hub 
of Salonika, fearing rumours of a Great Power carve-up of Macedonia which 
would deliver the region to its former or present Christian subjects, sought 
to sabotage foreign intervention by marching on the Porte and demanding a 
return to the abandoned 1876 constitution. But behind this “Young Turk” 
mutiny-turned-revolution was not only the urgency of “saving the empire” 
but an equally visceral anxiety as to the fate of Muslims in Rumelia, that 
is what remained of Turkey in Europe9. For Irish Unionists, fears of Papist 
atrocities, harking back to massacres in the 1640s, were nothing short of 
“foundational” (Beiner 2007, 373). For Ittihad’s Salonika cadres, whether 
born there or not, the fear was not based just on historic memory but contem-
porary reality, as fully realised in the Balkan states’ 1912 onslaught. At least 
240,000 terrified muhajirs fled from a Macedonian and Thracian hinterland 
to the Salonikan choke-point and, where they could, took ship to the rela-
tive safety of Anatolia (Rankin 1914, 304). The city itself fell to the Greeks 
in late October. But even before that catastrophe had struck, in the closed 
sessions of its 1910 and 1911 congresses there – around the same time that 
Ulster Unionism was moving towards its own strident belligerency – Ittihad 
was debating how to shore up and strengthen what remained of the empire 
by ensuring the hegemonic position of the Turkish nation within it. New 
to this agenda was the notion of breaking up the alleged disloyal and sedi-
tious ethnies through dispersal to far parts of the empire where they would 
be dissolved among loyal Muslims populations, a policy one British observer 
likened “to pounding the non-Turkish elements […] in a Turkish mortar” 
(Akçam 2004, 131; 2013, 258-279).
Whether such considerations were part of a predetermined, intentionalist 
agenda to carry out a root and branch destruction of the Ottoman Armenians 
is part of a different discussion. What matters here is the way in which Ittihad 
began ‘imagining’ a still imperial Ottomania through a nationalising prism 
of zero-sum struggle for space against internal ethnic competitors. What one 
historian of Great War Ireland has referred to as “a conflict between traumatic 
sensitivities of victimhood and triumphalist proclamations of victory” might 
equally apply to the way Ittihad transferred their sense of existential struggle 
from the other side of Bosphorus to eastern Anatolia, casting former Arme-
nian partners in the process into Bulgarian-style bogeyman (Beiner 2007, 
368; Suny 2015, 361-364). This besieged mentality as it infected the whole 
post-1913 Ittihad-commanded, Ottoman edifice, in turn ensured that after 
they had done their worst in obliterating the Armenian presence on the pla-
9 See Dekmejian 1986, 85-96, for a significant “the personal as political” analysis.
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teau the only meaningful politico-military direction for Dashnaks and the 
like, was that of confirming Ittihad’s self-fulfilling prophecy. The path to 
Armenian independence in what would reduce to a tiny remnant of historic 
Armenia from 1918 would be paved with ongoing massacres committed by 
its militias against Muslims, inter-communal massacres and Kemalist mas-
sacres on a grand-scale against the starving survivors of the genocide, all in 
conditions of apocalyptic suffering10.
If the Irish situation would seem to diverge from this absolute nadir it 
was not however because the post-Easter Rising political ground had some-
how shifted back to the middle. On the contrary, with Carson’s star in the 
ascendant in Westminster politics where he led the combined Conservative-
Unionist opposition to Asquith, and with the backing of David Lloyd George 
– the vastly more bellicose and pro-Unionist Prime Minister in waiting – for 
a permanent exclusion of six Ulster counties from the terms of Home Rule, 
the Redmondite position became entirely untenable (Hennessey 1998, 144-
152). His party’s electoral obliteration would be confirmed in the December 
1918 British general election in which a now overtly IRB, Eamonn de Valera-
led and hence physical force-orientated Sinn Fein, swept the board in the 
south, proceeding to unilaterally declare an Irish independence with its own 
separate republican Assembly. But the tipping point on the road to military 
confrontation between Dublin and London as well as between Dublin and 
Belfast had already occurred at the one key moment in the war when London 
had itself been faced with military collapse and hence defeat: the moment 
of the initially, massively successful March 1918 German offensive on the 
Western front. Lloyd George’s response was to rush to impose the one thing 
on Ireland no Westminster administration had dared yet do; conscription. 
From there, the decision – made without any Irish political consultation – was 
treated not as some emergency attempt to plug an acute manpower shortage 
but as a pretext to the dismantling of Home Rule and hence Irish liberty. A 
Sinn Fein led-resistance campaign but with support from across the national 
political spectrum was met in turn by the attempted round-up and arrest of 
some 150 leading Sinn Feiners, accused – with only flimsy, and quite possi-
bly fabricated intelligence – of being party to a “German plot” to foment an-
other Irish insurrection. Nevertheless, the intelligence was believed by British 
ministers (McMahon 2008, 24). It was in a strange way as if the events of 
24 April 1915 had come full circle. But with one compelling difference. Save 
those who had died in British uniform, or in the Easter Rising, Ireland still 
had the majority of its able-bodied, battle-age menfolk – at least in principle 
10 Hovannisian 1967, for the epic struggle against impossible odds; McCarthy 1995, 
esp. 198-200, 201, for atrocities committed in its name. See also Bloxham 2005, 103-105; 
Reynolds 2011, 197-198, 210-212.
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– with which to parry the Empire striking back. Armenia had not. Most of 
its never-to-be freedom-fighters had signed their own death-warrant when 
they had acquiesced to their religious and political leadership’s counsel to 
enlist in the Ottoman army. In the subsequent wars of Irish and Armenian 
independence the cause of advanced Irish nationalism had a gender-based 
commodity which its decimated Armenian counterpart sorely lacked.
5. Conclusion 
Within the wider catastrophe of the Great War, the Medz Yeghern stands 
out. The post-war absence of thousands of indigenous Armenian communi-
ties across Anatolia, and the fact that other groups, notably Kurds, were able 
to fill the ensuing political and cultural vacuum, confirms how thoroughly 
the Ittihad carried through its anti-Armenian extermination. While acknowl-
edging its extraordinariness, this essay, however, has sought to draw parallels 
with another closely synchronous, wartime narrative the aim of which has 
been to propose that while at the extreme end of the violence spectrum, the 
Medz Yeghern remains an event which can be understood within a compar-
ative historical framework. The scale of the brutality and atrocity commit-
ted by British forces, especially auxiliary units such as the Black and Tans in 
the Anglo-Irish war from 1919, or the reprisals and ethnic cleansing enacted 
by the UVF against Catholic Irish within Ulster in the same period, were 
clearly of a lesser scale than those enacted in Ottoman Armenia11. They al-
so lacked an exterminatory agenda. Even so, otherwise socially conservative 
elites and their plebeian supporters, especially in increasingly exposed citadels 
of a once guaranteed imperial heartland such as Belfast; as they struggled to 
find ways of preserving the territorial status quo against the encroaching na-
tionalist challenge, evinced the same or very similar shifts to a more firmly 
exclusive sense of community, a more hostile attitude to those who failed to 
fit that prescript, and a more ready recourse to extreme violence when believ-
ing themselves threatened, as did their Ittihad counterparts.
But it was not just on the presumed hegemonic, national-imperial side 
of the equation that the war had a radicalising effect. We began by empha-
sising that until the summer of 1914, grounds for political accommodation 
between national Ireland and imperial Britain as between the claims of Ar-
menian autonomy within Ottomania, were plausible: that the notion that 
“neither Britishness nor Irishness were mutually exclusive identities” had its 
Ottoman Armenian parallels, and that just as Irish republicanism was “an 
obscure minority obsession” so the urge to physical force solutions to the fu-
11 See Townshend 1975, for an overview; Wilson 2010, for comparative analysis of the 
violence in Ulster.
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ture of the plateau were far from mainstream Armenian politics (Hennessey 
1998, 235-236). Under peacetime circumstances these were the calculations 
of dangerous men, and women. They hinted at ideologues prepared to throw a 
dice on the possibility of getting a step closer to a national dream while think-
ing little or nothing of the consequences in terms of the welfare of those for 
whom the vision was supposedly intended. Arguably worse, some may have 
calculated in classic national liberation fashion that state retribution meted 
out against that populace would fan a people’s insurrection.
Nevertheless, the war undoubtedly offered opportunities to nationalists 
willing to play for high risks. By the very nature of being subject to another 
more dominant nation, these opportunities largely revolved around bringing 
into play some outside force or forces willing to entertain military support for 
insurrection as part of some quid pro quo. If for no other reason than that such 
a course of action would brand protagonists as traitors and thus liable to an ex-
emplary punishment of they and most likely their families and communities, 
there was unsurprisingly no grass-roots rush to follow. In this sense, the Irish 
Volunteers and Armenian Ottoman druzhiny, like other similar ethnic mobili-
sations at the war’s outset, while part of the bigger picture, remained marginal. 
Yet there was an obverse side of this coin. Standing on the sidelines was quite 
different to being compelled to don the uniform of a perceived imperial master. 
Lack of enthusiasm for getting killed was not just the wartime preserve of sub-
altern groups, whether metropolitan or colonial. But where it took on aspects of 
mass disaffection the relationship was a close one. In some colonial instances, as 
for instance, in the Volta-Bani region of French West Africa, or the Semirechye 
districts of Russian Turkestan, conscription very often directly into a labour bat-
talions, in 1915-16, was the spark to major proto-national insurrections which 
were in turn met by imperial armies or state-armed settlers with genocidal vio-
lence (Levene 2015, 65-72). Enforced conscription was equally a touchstone in 
both Ireland and Ottoman Armenia as to where many ordinary people’s loyal-
ties lay. Growing murmurs of disaffection leading to desertion or direct resist-
ance in early 1915 Armenia had their close corollary in Ireland where the IRB 
used a rumour of compulsion as the pretext for their Easter 1916 mobilisation 
while the actual British attempt to enforce it two years later led to a nation-wide 
resistance not to say the threat of Irish troop mutinies in the British army, and 
was the undoubted catalyst to the Anglo-Irish war (Hennessey 1998, 126-127; 
Townshend 2015, 351). In other words, while the advanced Irish nationalist 
mobilisation in 1914 or even 1916 was premature, by 1918 – with conscription 
as the trigger – it was the subject of popular, national acclamation. This is also 
in line with what was happening elsewhere in ethnically subordinate regions of 
imperial Europe where towards the end of the Great War demands for national 
self-determination as very often encouraged by vocal diaspora groups, become 
the goad to large numbers of men in uniform (very often captured POWs) jet-
tisoning one imperial allegiance for another national one.
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The Armenian experience was neither aberrant nor apart from this ‘new 
normal’. Except in one joyless regard. The early mobilisations envisaged or re-
alised by breakaway Dashnaks and AND, could only have followed the same 
trajectory as Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians and other would-be successor nation-
states if there had been a reservoir of men in or out of uniform who might 
have been turned at some later stage. Actually, where AND, for instance, did 
recruit, as it did for the French-aligned Légion Arménienne, from late 1916, 
there were many willing volunteers. But the majority of these were from 
France, America and Egypt. The very few, who were from Ottoman Arme-
nia, were genocide survivors or escapees (Bloxham 2005, 140-143, 150-151).
The Armenian experience of the Great War by way of the “genocidal 
turn” thus offers a strong indication as to how a population that mostly re-
frained from following the advanced nationalist route in 1914 had – at least 
among those who were still alive – become avant-garde advocates of precise-
ly that by 1916. Equally, “The terrible beauty is born” of Easter 1916, may 
not have converted all Catholic Irishmen into unequivocal Sinn Feiners but 
it certainly by then had discredited the alternative path of imperial accom-
modation (Yeats 2016 [1921], 53-54). The irony, of course, is that the ‘will to 
power’ alone in such asymmetrical military confrontations could never have 
been enough to win such little nations their dreams of independence. Ireland 
and Armenia needed international – especially at war’s end American – sup-
port to overcome their intrinsic weakness against imperial opponents. The 
Irish with at least a manpower to tap, got as far as achieving a state in the 
south, yet still under the aegis of the British crown and minus the six Ulster 
counties leaving Unionism triumphant in the north. In the final phase of this 
struggle, nationalist Irishmen fought nationalist Irishmen in this most bitter 
phase of “the Troubles”. An even weaker, militarily depleted Armenia having 
struggled to defend itself against resurgent Turkish-Kemalist forces had no 
choice but to accept absorption into the Bolshevik sphere as the only way to 
save itself from annihilation. In the now standard, post-1918 struggle for the 
modern nation-state, national-imperial or plain radical national, everything 
was seemingly allowable including compromise through force majeure, even 
genocide. Bar one thing: a return to the more fluid plurality of a world in 
which Protestant Ulstermen and Catholic neighbours, Armenian Christians 
and Muslim Turks, and many other peoples besides, could live in numbers 
and in safety alongside and together with.
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